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US Electoral Integrity in 2026: Navigating the Patchwork of American Election Tech

Voting machine and ballot envelope depicted on USA map background. Illustration in neutral tones with checklist and receipt details.

Abstract

The American electoral landscape in late 2025 and early 2026 represents a complex convergence of century-old traditions and cutting-edge digital infrastructure. As the United States moves beyond the contentious 2024 presidential cycle and prepares for the 2026 midterms, the mechanisms by which citizens cast their ballots are under unprecedented scrutiny. This report provides an exhaustive examination of the current status of election technologies, the divergent paths of voting methodology—ranging from the entrenched plurality system to novel approaches like Ranked Choice and Approval Voting—and the rigorous security frameworks designed to protect the franchise. The administration of elections in the United States is a decentralized enterprise, executed by thousands of local jurisdictions under a patchwork of state laws. This fragmentation has fostered a unique environment where technological innovation coexists with legislative retrenchment. While some municipalities experiment with open-source voting hardware and cryptographic verification systems, state legislatures are increasingly intervening to standardize—and often restrict—the methods available to voters. This analysis explores the technical specifications of modern voting machines, the mathematical and practical implications of alternative voting systems, and the logistical security of mail-in balloting. It further dissects the cryptographic advances that promise end-to-end verifiability and the administrative protocols that ensure chain of custody. By synthesizing data from recent elections, legislative texts, and technical specifications, this report offers a detailed roadmap of the future of voting in America.

Chapter 1: The Evolution and Status of Alternative Voting Methods

The mechanisms by which Americans translate individual preferences into collective decisions are undergoing a profound transformation. While the "First-Past-The-Post" (FPTP) or plurality system remains the dominant paradigm, dissatisfaction with vote splitting and the "spoiler effect" has catalyzed a movement toward alternative methods. However, the period between 2024 and 2026 marked a significant turning point where this momentum faced potent political and legislative counter-movements. The debate has shifted from theoretical academic discussions to concrete legislative battles and ballot measures, revealing a deep ideological fissure regarding the definition of fair representation.

Ranked Choice Voting (RCV): Mechanics, Adoption, and Resistance

Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), also known as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) in single-winner contexts or Single Transferable Vote (STV) in multi-winner contexts, has emerged as the most prominent alternative to plurality voting. Its central premise is to allow voters to express a hierarchy of preferences rather than a singular binary choice.1

The Computational and Theoretical Mechanism of RCV

In a standard plurality election, a voter selects one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins, even if that total is far less than a majority. This often leads to the election of candidates who are opposed by a majority of the electorate but win due to a fractured opposition. RCV addresses this by capturing more information about voter intent.

In an RCV election, the ballot interface allows the voter to rank candidates: first choice, second choice, third choice, and so on. The tabulation process functions as a series of simulated, instantaneous runoff elections carried out by algorithm.

  1. First Round Tally: The system counts all first-preference votes. If a candidate receives a majority (defined as 50 percent plus one vote) of the active ballots, they are declared the winner immediately.

  2. Elimination and Transfer: If no candidate achieves this threshold, the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes is eliminated.

  3. Redistribution: The ballots that listed the eliminated candidate as their first choice are not discarded. Instead, they are "transferred" to the candidate ranked next-highest on each individual ballot.

  4. Iteration: This process of elimination and redistribution repeats iteratively. In each round, the field of candidates narrows, and the denominator of active ballots may decrease slightly if some ballots become "exhausted" (i.e., they have no further valid rankings for continuing candidates). The process concludes when a candidate secures a majority of the continuing ballots.3

Mathematically, this method attempts to mitigate the spoiler effect, where two ideologically similar candidates split the vote, allowing a third, less preferred candidate to win. However, RCV does not guarantee a Condorcet winner—a candidate who would defeat every other candidate in a head-to-head matchup—in all scenarios. The complexity of the "monotonicity" criterion means that in rare theoretical cases, ranking a candidate higher could hurt them, or ranking them lower could help them, though empirical evidence of this in public elections is sparse.5

Current Status and Adoption (2025-2026)

As of early 2026, RCV has established a foothold in several key jurisdictions but faces a growing legislative firewall. The adoption pattern reflects a clear divide between municipal innovation and state-level prohibition.

Statewide Adoption:

  • Maine: Continues to use RCV for all state and federal primary and general elections, having pioneered the reform statewide.

  • Alaska: Utilizes a unique "Top-Four" primary system combined with an RCV general election. All candidates run in a single nonpartisan primary, and the top four vote-getters advance to the general election where RCV determines the winner. This model has been credited with electing moderate candidates who can build broad coalitions.2

Municipal Adoption:

Major cities have become laboratories for RCV implementation.

  • New York City: Uses RCV for primary elections, significantly altering campaign strategies in the nation's largest media market.

  • San Francisco, Minneapolis, and Salt Lake City: Have long-standing RCV systems for local offices.

  • Washington, D.C.: As of 2025, the District of Columbia implemented RCV for all elections, further cementing the method's status in urban governance.2

  • Expansion: By April 2025, RCV was in use for local elections in 47 US cities, including Seattle, reflecting a grassroots demand for electoral reform.2

Military and Overseas Voters: A less visible but critical application of ranked ballots is for military and overseas voters (UOCAVA voters). Six states utilize ranked ballots for these voters as a contingency. Because mailing runoff ballots back and forth across oceans is logistically impossible within the short timeframes of a runoff, overseas voters receive a ranked ballot. If a runoff occurs, their rankings are used to determine their vote in the second round instantly, ensuring their voice is heard without the need for a second mailing.2

The Legislative Backlash: A New Era of Prohibition

Despite these advances, a significant trend in 2024 and 2025 was the prohibition of RCV by state legislatures controlled by opponents of the system. Arguments against RCV often cite complexity, potential for voter confusion, and the delay in reporting final results as reasons for restriction.

By January 2026, the legislative landscape had shifted dramatically. Seven states had laws authorizing or requiring the use of RCV, while eighteen states had enacted laws prohibiting or restricting its use.3 This wave of bans represents a coordinated effort to freeze the status quo of plurality voting.

Case Study: Missouri Amendment 7 (2024)

A prominent example of this backlash occurred in Missouri. In November 2024, voters approved Amendment 7, a legislatively referred constitutional amendment.

  • The Mandate: The amendment explicitly prohibited "the ranking of candidates" and required that the winner of a political party primary be determined by plurality. It established that each voter has one vote per issue or open seat.6

  • The Arguments: Proponents framed the measure as a protection of "one person, one vote" and a safeguard against the "confusion" of ranking. Opponents argued it limited local control and stifled innovation. The measure passed with approximately 68 percent of the vote, signaling strong public support for traditional voting structures in the state.7

  • The St. Louis Exception: Crucially, the amendment contained a "grandfather clause." It did not apply to any nonpartisan municipal election held in a city that had an ordinance in effect as of November 5, 2024, permitting alternative voting methods. This carved out a protective space for St. Louis, which uses Approval Voting, preventing the state ban from overturning the city's established system.9

Case Study: North Dakota and the End of Fargo's RCV North Dakota took a more aggressive stance. In 2023, the legislature attempted to ban approval voting, but Governor Doug Burgum vetoed the bill, citing "home rule" principles. However, the legislative will to standardize elections prevailed. In April 2025, Governor Kelly Armstrong signed a bill banning both Ranked Choice Voting and Approval Voting in the state. Unlike Missouri, this ban did not exempt existing systems, effectively forcing the city of Fargo to dismantle its Approval Voting system, which it had used since 2018.11 This starkly illustrates the tension between local innovation and state-level standardization that defines the 2026 election landscape.

Approval Voting: The St. Louis Experiment

Approval Voting represents a distinct theoretical approach from RCV. Instead of ranking candidates, voters simply select all candidates they find acceptable. The candidate with the most votes wins. This method eliminates the complexity of ranking and tabulation rounds, relying instead on a single summation of approval.11

Operational Mechanics in St. Louis

St. Louis, Missouri, adopted a specific variation of this system via Proposition D in 2020. The city utilizes a nonpartisan primary where voters can approve of as many candidates as they wish. The top two vote-getters, regardless of party affiliation, advance to a general election runoff.13

The 2025 Mayoral Election Results:

In the 2025 St. Louis mayoral election, held on April 8, 2025, this system was put to the test in a high-profile rematch.

  • Candidates: Incumbent Mayor Tishaura Jones faced Alderwoman Cara Spencer.

  • The Primary: The approval voting primary allowed voters to signal support for both candidates if they chose, but the "top-two" mechanic ensured that the general election would be a head-to-head contest between the strongest candidates, rather than a fractured field.

  • The Outcome: Cara Spencer defeated incumbent Tishaura Jones in the general election.13

  • Analysis: Proponents argue that Approval Voting better captures voter sentiment and avoids the "center-squeeze" effect, where moderate candidates are eliminated early in RCV or plurality systems. The data from St. Louis suggests that voters utilize the multi-selection capability, with an average of 1.56 votes per ballot in initial trials, indicating a willingness to support multiple candidates.15

STAR Voting: The Eugene Rejection

STAR (Score Then Automatic Runoff) Voting is a hybrid method where voters score candidates (e.g., from 0 to 5 stars). The tabulation sums the scores to identify the top two finalists, who then face off in an "automatic runoff" where the finalist preferred by more voters wins.16

Advocates championed STAR voting for the city of Eugene, Oregon, placing Measure 20-349 on the May 2024 ballot. The proposal aimed to implement the system for mayor, city council, and utility board elections starting in 2026.17

The Failure: The measure failed significantly, with approximately 67 percent of voters opposing it and only 33 percent in support.16

  • Reasons for Rejection: Opposition groups, including some voter advocacy organizations, argued that the system was untested in public political elections and could lead to strategic voting or confusion. The rejection in Eugene suggests that while voters may be dissatisfied with the status quo, they are cautious about adopting complex, experimental systems without a broader track record of success.16

The Borda Count and Positional Voting

The Borda Count is a positional voting system where voters rank candidates, and points are assigned based on the position (e.g., first place gets a certain number of points, second gets one less, etc.). The candidate with the most total points wins.

Status: While theoretically elegant, the Borda Count is not currently used for public political elections in the United States.18

  • Vulnerabilities: Academic literature highlights its extreme vulnerability to "strategic nomination" or cloning. If a party runs multiple similar candidates, they can manipulate the point totals to their advantage. This "clone proof" failure makes it viable for sports awards (like the Heisman Trophy) but dangerous for partisan political contests where strategy is paramount.19

Voting Method

Mechanism

Key US Adoptions (Current/Recent)

Status (2025-2026)

Plurality

Vote for one; most votes wins.

Universal default (Federal/State).

Mandated by new bans in states like MO, ID.

Ranked Choice (RCV)

Rank candidates; instant runoff rounds.

Maine, Alaska, NYC, San Francisco.

Banned in 18 states; expanding in cities.

Approval

Vote for all acceptable; most votes wins.

St. Louis, MO.

Banned in North Dakota (ending Fargo usage).

STAR

Score 0-5; sum scores; top 2 runoff.

None (Proposed in Eugene, OR).

Rejected by Eugene voters in 2024.

Chapter 2: Voting Machine Technology and Hardware

The physical interface of democracy—the voting machine—has undergone a cyclical evolution. Following the shift to electronic voting after the 2000 election, the industry has largely pivoted back toward paper-based systems, reinforced by sophisticated digital scanners and accessibility devices. This "software-independent" approach is now the industry standard, codified by federal guidelines and state laws.

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) vs. Optical Scan

Two primary technologies dominate the US landscape:

1. Optical Scan Systems:

This is the most prevalent technology in 2026. Voters mark a paper ballot by hand (filling in ovals or connecting arrows), which is then fed into a scanner. The scanner captures an image of the ballot and tabulates the vote using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technology.

  • Benefits: The system provides an inherent paper trail—the ballot itself. It is intuitive for voters and resilient to power failures (votes can be cast into a secure bin even if the scanner is down).

  • Security: The paper ballot serves as the "truth" in any audit. If the digital count is hacked or malfunctions, the paper remains.20

2. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE):

Voters make selections on a touchscreen or dial interface. The votes are stored in the machine's memory components.

  • Legacy Issues: Older DREs often lacked a paper trail, leading to unresolvable security concerns. If the memory was corrupted, the vote was lost.

  • Modern Adaptation: Modern DREs are almost universally required to include a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).22

The Imperative of VVPAT

The Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail is a printer assembly attached to a DRE. When a voter casts a ballot electronically, the machine prints a paper record of their choices behind a glass window. The voter reviews this record to confirm accuracy before finalizing the vote. This paper record remains in the machine (on a continuous spool or as cut sheets) and serves as the official record for audits and recounts.20

Research on Voter Confidence: Research indicates that VVPATs are critical for voter confidence. Studies utilizing data from elections over the last two decades have consistently shown that voters using DREs with VVPATs exhibit higher confidence levels than those using paperless DREs. Interestingly, the confidence gap between VVPAT-DREs and hand-marked paper ballots is negligible, suggesting that "verifiability" is the key driver of trust, regardless of whether the interface is a pen or a screen.24 The VVPAT provides a physical redundancy that purely electronic systems lack, bridging the gap between digital convenience and analog security.

Open Source Voting Systems: The Rise of VotingWorks

A significant development in the 2025-2026 market is the challenge to the oligopoly of traditional vendors (such as ES&S, Dominion, and Hart InterCivic) by non-profit, open-source developers. VotingWorks, a non-profit equipment vendor, has successfully deployed systems that use publicly available code.

Transparency as Security:

Unlike proprietary systems where the source code is a trade secret protected by intellectual property laws, VotingWorks publishes its code for public scrutiny. This allows independent security researchers to identify vulnerabilities and verify that the code does exactly what it claims to do.

  • Certification: In 2025, VotingWorks demonstrated systems submitted for federal certification, marking a pivotal moment where open-source technology moved from theoretical advocacy to regulatory reality. This certification process validates that open-source models can meet the same rigorous durability and logic standards as corporate counterparts.25

  • Hardware Independence: These systems often utilize commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware components (like standard tablets and printers) rather than bespoke, custom-manufactured voting machines. This reduces costs and mitigates supply chain risks.25

Federal Standards: VVSG 2.0

The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) adopted the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0, which represent a significant leap in security standards.

  • Wireless Prohibition: VVSG 2.0 explicitly prohibits wireless connectivity (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) in voting machines to prevent remote hacking.

  • Interoperability: It mandates Common Data Formats (CDF), allowing election data to be exported in a standard way that can be read by independent audit tools, breaking vendor lock-in.

  • Implementation: As of 2026, manufacturers are in the transition phase, with new systems being designed to meet these rigorous specifications while legacy systems certified under VVSG 1.0 continue to be used.26

Chapter 3: Cryptographic Security and End-to-End Verifiability

While paper provides a physical check, modern cryptography offers a mathematical one. The integration of advanced cryptographic protocols into election systems—specifically Homomorphic Encryption and End-to-End (E2E) Verifiability—represents the frontier of election security, ensuring that the software itself is honest.

Homomorphic Encryption

Standard encryption protects data in transit and at rest, but generally, data must be decrypted to be processed (e.g., counted). This decryption step creates a "vulnerability window" where the data is exposed in plaintext. Homomorphic encryption solves this by allowing computations to be performed directly on the encrypted data (ciphertext) without ever decrypting it.

The Concept:

In the context of an election, the system can sum the encrypted votes.

  • Imagine a vote for Candidate A is encrypted into a cipher value.

  • The tallying authority computes the sum of the votes by performing a mathematical operation on the ciphertexts themselves.

  • The result of this operation is a new encrypted value that, when decrypted, yields the sum of the votes.

  • Only the final result is decrypted. The individual votes remain encrypted throughout the entire tabulation process.28

The Paillier Cryptosystem is frequently used for this purpose due to its "additive homomorphic" properties. It ensures that even if the tabulation server is compromised by an insider, the attacker cannot read individual ballots to see how specific people voted, protecting voter privacy while allowing the count to proceed.30

Microsoft ElectionGuard and E2E Verifiability

Microsoft's ElectionGuard is an open-source software development kit (SDK) that implements these cryptographic principles to make elections "End-to-End Verifiable." It does not replace the voting machine but acts as a security overlay.

1. Cast as Intended:

When a voter casts a ballot, they receive a tracking code (often a hash of their encrypted ballot). They can use this code on a public web portal to confirm that their ballot was received by the central server and recorded exactly as they cast it.

2. Counted as Cast:

This is the revolutionary step. Observers, political parties, and independent auditors can download the entire encrypted file of votes and the mathematical proofs (Zero-Knowledge Proofs) generated by the system.

  • Zero-Knowledge Proofs: These are cryptographic methods that allow the system to prove it counted the votes correctly without revealing the votes themselves.

  • Independent Verification: Anyone with the technical know-how can write their own "verifier" software (or use open-source verifiers) to prove that the final tally is mathematically consistent with the encrypted votes. This eliminates the need to simply "trust" the election authority's software.31

Adoption: ElectionGuard has been piloted in elections in Wisconsin, California, Idaho, and Utah. In these pilots, the system demonstrated that it allows voters to verify their votes while maintaining the secrecy of the ballot via the homomorphic properties of the encryption.33

Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology

While blockchain is often touted as a solution for secure voting due to its immutability and transparency, its adoption in US public elections remains limited and controversial.

The Debate:

  • Proponents: Argue that blockchain could provide a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger of votes that no single entity could alter.35

  • Skeptics: Security experts (including those at MIT and CISA) argue that blockchain does not solve the "client-side" security problem. If a voter's phone is infected with malware, the malware can change the vote before it is written to the blockchain. Furthermore, blockchain introduces new complexities regarding key management and the potential for long-term de-anonymization of voters.

International Use Cases: The most significant recent use was by Mexico's National Electoral Institute (INE) in June 2024 for expatriate voting. The system used homomorphic encryption (Paillier) and a blockchain ledger to secure votes from citizens living in the US and Canada.36 However, within the US domestic system, skepticism remains high, and internet-based voting is generally rejected by security agencies (CISA, FBI) in favor of paper-backed systems.

Chapter 4: The Logistics and Security of Mail-in Voting

Mail-in voting, having surged during the 2020 pandemic, has stabilized as a permanent fixture of the American electoral process. Far from being a chaotic element, the mail-in ballot ecosystem is underpinned by sophisticated logistics technology and strict verification protocols.

Traceability: The Intelligent Mail Barcode (IMb)

The backbone of mail ballot security is the United States Postal Service's Intelligent Mail Barcode (IMb) technology. This is not a standard consumer barcode but a data-rich identifier.

Structure and Function:

  • The IMb is a 65-bar barcode printed on the ballot envelope. It contains specific data fields for the barcode ID, service type, mailer ID, serial number, and routing code.37

  • Serialized Tracking: Crucially, election mail uses serialized IMbs. Each ballot envelope has a unique serial number associated with a specific voter in the election database.

  • The Tracking Loop: As the ballot moves through the postal stream, it passes through sorting machines that scan the IMb. These scans create tracking events (e.g., "Departed USPS Facility," "Out for Delivery").

Voter Visibility (BallotTrax):

Platforms like BallotTrax utilize this data stream. They ingest the scan data from the USPS and push notifications to voters via SMS or email (e.g., "Your ballot has been picked up," "Your ballot has been received").

  • Adoption: By 2025, BallotTrax was serving nearly 60 million voters across 19 states.38 The company was awarded a second US patent in 2025 for this tracking and notification system, solidifying its role as a critical infrastructure provider.40 This visibility closes the information loop, assuring the voter that their ballot was not lost in transit.

Automated Signature Verification (ASV)

Upon return, the ballot envelope must be authenticated. The primary method is signature verification—comparing the signature on the envelope affidavit with the signature on the voter's registration record.

Technology and Algorithms:

High-volume jurisdictions (like those in California, Colorado, and Oregon) use ASV software from vendors like BlueCrest, Parascript, or Kodak Alaris.

  • The software captures a high-resolution image of the signature.

  • It analyzes geometric features: stroke width, slant, loop height, pen lifts, and pressure points.41

  • Scoring: The system applies algorithms to quantify similarities and differences, assigning a confidence score (0-100) to the match.

Thresholds and Bias:

  • Confidence Thresholds: If the score exceeds a set threshold (e.g., 96 percent), the signature is automatically accepted. If it falls below, it is flagged for human review.

  • Accuracy Debate: Manufacturers claim accuracy rates up to 99 percent.42 However, independent studies and media reports have highlighted potential error rates, suggesting true positive rates could be lower in real-world conditions (as low as 74 percent in some studies), potentially flagging valid ballots for review.43

  • Bias Mitigation: There is ongoing research into whether ASV algorithms exhibit bias against younger voters (whose signatures are still evolving) or voters with certain motor disabilities. To mitigate this, best practices dictate that a human always makes the final decision to reject a ballot. The software acts as a "green light" filter; it can approve a ballot, but only a human can reject one.45

Physical Security: Drop Boxes and Retrieval Teams

Physical security complements the digital tracking.

  • Drop Box Standards: Official ballot drop boxes are constructed of heavy-gauge steel with narrow apertures designed to prevent tampering or the introduction of hazardous materials. They are typically monitored by 24/7 video surveillance.

  • Retrieval Protocols: Ballots are retrieved by bipartisan teams (two people of different party affiliations).

  • Chain of Custody: These teams must sign a chain-of-custody log documenting the time, location, and the serial number on the transport bag's seal.

  • Tamper-Evident Seals: Seals are used on all transport containers. The serial number of the seal is recorded at the point of departure and verified at the point of arrival (the election office). If the numbers do not match, the batch is investigated.46

Chapter 5: Chain of Custody and Audit Protocols

The integrity of an election relies on the ability to prove that the ballots counted are the same ones cast. This is achieved through rigorous chain of custody and post-election audits.

Chain of Custody Documentation

Chain of custody refers to the unbroken trail of documentation that records the sequence of custody, control, transfer, analysis, and disposition of physical and electronic evidence.

  • Seal Logs: Every time a ballot container is opened or closed, a new seal is applied, and its number is logged.

  • Custody Events: Logs must be updated for every event: securing unvoted ballots, retrieving drop boxes, moving ballots to central count, and placing ballots in retention storage.

  • Bipartisan Verification: Critical steps, such as the transport of ballots or the adjudication of ambiguous marks, require the presence and signature of representatives from opposing political parties.46

Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs)

Post-election audits have moved from simple fixed-percentage recounts to Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs).

  • The Principle: An RLA uses statistical methods to determine how many ballots need to be manually checked to provide strong evidence that the reported outcome is correct.

  • The Methodology: The tighter the margin of victory, the more ballots must be audited. If a race is won by 0.1 percent, the audit might require a near-full hand count. If the margin is 20 percent, a smaller random sample suffices.

  • Technological Requirement: Effective RLAs require voting systems that can export a "Cast Vote Record" (CVR)—a spreadsheet showing how the machine interpreted every single ballot. Modern systems certified to VVSG 2.0 standards are designed to export CVRs natively, facilitating these advanced audits.48

The Georgia Hand Count Controversy (2024)

The tension between automated efficiency and manual verification came to a head in Georgia in late 2024. The State Election Board passed a rule requiring poll workers to count the number of paper ballots by hand at each precinct after polls closed to ensure the total matched the machine count.

  • Conflict: This rule was opposed by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, who argued it was not supported by statute and would delay results.

  • Implication: This highlighted the ongoing struggle over "human verification" versus "machine efficiency." While the rule was framed as a security measure, critics viewed it as a potential vector for delay and chaos. It underscores the fragility of administrative procedures when they become politicized.49

Chapter 6: Analysis of Procedural Implications and Voter Confidence

The integration of these technologies has profound effects on the administration of elections and the public's perception of them.

Efficiency vs. Verification

The use of ASV and high-speed sorters allows election offices to process tens of thousands of ballots per hour, a necessity given that nearly 30 percent of voters cast mail ballots in 2024.51 However, this industrial scale can alienate observers who do not understand the technology. The "black box" nature of proprietary algorithms for signature matching can breed distrust. The counter-measure is the cure process, where voters whose signatures are rejected are notified (often via the same BallotTrax system) and given a chance to verify their identity, ensuring that technology does not disenfranchise eligible voters.45

The Confidence Gap and Partisan Trends

Research suggests a correlation between the availability of tracking tools and voter confidence. Knowing the precise status of a ballot reduces anxiety about "lost votes." However, the politicization of mail voting has created a partisan divide.

  • 2020 to 2024 Trends: While Democrats utilized mail voting at much higher rates in 2020 (60 percent vs. 32 percent for Republicans), data from the 2024 election shows a narrowing of this gap. Mail voting among Democrats decreased to 37 percent, while Republican usage dropped to 24 percent. The overall mail voting rate settled at 29 percent, indicating a post-pandemic stabilization where in-person voting rebounded.51

  • Voter Behavior: This suggests that while convenience is valued, the ritual of in-person voting remains powerful, and partisan messaging heavily influences method selection.

The Impact of Complex Voting Methods

The debate over RCV often centers on "exhausted ballots"—ballots that do not rank all candidates and are discarded if all marked choices are eliminated. Critics argue this leads to "disenfranchisement by complexity." Proponents argue that RCV increases the "effective vote" by allowing more nuanced expression.

  • Academic Findings: Research into the 2024 and 2025 elections suggests that while RCV eliminates the spoiler effect, it imposes a higher cognitive load on voters. The success of the "ban" movements in states like Missouri indicates that for many voters and legislators, simplicity (one person, one vote) is valued over the mathematical expressiveness of ranked systems. The "Loser's Regret" phenomenon also plays a role; voters whose preferred candidates lose under RCV are more likely to view the system as unfair compared to plurality losers.53

Chapter 7: The Future of Voting in America (2026 and Beyond)

As the United States approaches the 2026 midterms, the election ecosystem is defined by a "technological federalism" where the gap between states is widening.

The Divergence of State Codes

We are witnessing a bifurcation of American democracy.

  • The "Blue" Path: Progressive municipalities and states are deepening their investment in alternative voting methods (RCV/Approval), accessibility tech (remote ballot marking), and expansive mail voting with tracking.

  • The "Red" Path: Conservative states are solidifying a return to traditionalism: banning RCV (as seen in MO, ID, ND), mandating hand-counts, and restricting mail voting.

  • Result: The "American voting experience" in 2026 will vary drastically depending on the voter's zip code. A voter in St. Louis will use Approval Voting to select a mayor, while a voter in Fargo, just a state away from a different border, will have lost that same right due to state preemption.

The AI Threat and Defense

The 2026 cycle will be the first midterms where Generative AI is fully mature.

  • The Threat: The potential for AI-generated disinformation—deepfakes of candidates or election officials—is acute. There is also the risk of AI-generated "spam" comments overwhelming public comment periods for election rules.

  • The Defense: Conversely, election officials are using AI to detect anomalies in voter registration databases and to analyze network traffic for cyber threats. Tech companies have signed accords to watermark AI content, though the efficacy of these voluntary measures remains to be seen.55

The Paper Standard

Despite the digital advances, the future of US voting is undeniably paper-based. The consensus among security experts, codified in the VVSG 2.0 and state laws, is that a software-independent record is essential. The "future" is not a move to internet voting, but rather a "Digitally Assisted Paper" system—where touchscreens mark paper, scanners read paper, and cryptography verifies the count of the paper.23

Conclusion

The status of election technologies in the USA is a narrative of tension between innovation and trust. Technologically, the systems have never been more secure: end-to-end verifiability, homomorphic encryption, and intelligent mail tracking provide a robust defense against manipulation. Yet, politically, the mechanisms of voting are more contested than ever.

The rejection of STAR voting in Eugene and the RCV bans in Missouri and North Dakota suggest a limit to the electorate's appetite for procedural complexity. Meanwhile, the successful defense of Approval Voting in St. Louis demonstrates that local communities still fight for systems that serve their specific needs. As we look to 2026, the stability of American democracy relies not just on the code inside the machines, but on the transparency of the processes and the continued consensus that the paper ballot—verified by the voter and audited by the official—remains the gold standard of legitimacy.

Appendix: Summary of Key Technological Specifications

Technology

Function

Key Security Feature

Current Adoption Status

VVPAT

Prints paper record of electronic vote.

Voter verification before casting; audit trail.

Standard in most DRE states (GA, NV, etc.).

Paillier Encryption

Encrypts ballot data.

Additive homomorphic property (tally encrypted votes).

Used in ElectionGuard pilots; Voatz (Mexico).

ElectionGuard

E2E Verifiability SDK.

Zero-knowledge proofs of tally correctness.

Pilot phases (UT, ID, WI); available in open source.

Intelligent Mail Barcode

Tracks mail envelopes.

Serialized tracking of individual voters.

Widespread usage with BallotTrax (19+ states).

Automated Sig. Verification

Matches envelope signatures.

Confidence scoring; geometric analysis.

Used in high-volume mail ballot states (CA, CO, OR).

Works cited

  1. WHERE IS RCV USED? - Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center, accessed January 25, 2026, https://www.rcvresources.org/where-is-rcv-used

  2. Ranked-choice voting in the United States - Wikipedia, accessed January 25, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked-choice_voting_in_the_United_States

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